Meno P89
Socrates initially claims that “true opinion is in no way a worse guide for correct action than knowledge.”
Later he arrives at the conclusion that “knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down.”
I would argue that correct opinion and knowledge are one in the same. Knowledge uses no more legitimate evidence to support its conclusions than correct opinion. All correct opinion leads to knowledge and all knowledge leads to correct opinion.
Socrates says that correct opinion is like a slave that is not tied down. Cannot knowledge, thought to be tied down, break its chains? When this happens do we experience a paradigm shift? Our knowledge was uprooted, and we arrive at a new opinion of it.
Socrates said that correct opinion is like a traveler who can give directions to a destination, but has not traveled there before. Cannot the terrain change on the man who had been there before? Could there be a more direct way? Perhaps an experienced traveler gave you directions to a destination he often frequented. His directions were long, based on his knowledge of landmarks of the terrain, but correct. Perhaps there was a man who had never frequented your destination, but was an experienced navigator with the stars. His route was untraditional, but more direct. Although he never visited the destination, is his correct opinion any less valuable? Is it more valuable?
When separating knowledge from correct opinion, believing that knowledge is somehow more grounded than correct opinion, we categorize and limit the legitimacy of an individual’s perspective of experience.
We arrive at correct opinion based on our knowledge of previous sequences and logic. We are told that smaller bodies fall towards larger bodies; that water evaporates at 212 deg F. We test these proposals by experiencing their phenomenon, and if they are duplicated based on their proposals by being rooted in this experience, we say they are knowledge. In reality these experiences are no more correct opinion than knowledge.
By separating correct opinion from knowledge, we undermine the process in which we acquire knowledge. We strip ourselves of the faith we need in correct opinion to test the beliefs that lead to knowledge.
Reconcile the ways one arrives at knowledge, and the ways that one arrives at correct opinion.
Opinion vs. Knowledge
Lets talk about opinion. Opinion is that which we infer from our knowledge. It is something that is not acquired, but rather intuitive. It requires no experience other than the reflection of knowledge. We use our knowledge to form accurate opinions.
When you are young you are filled with more opinions than knowledge. As you grow older your opinions grow more acute as your knowledge grows. You never have more knowledge than opinion, but opinion, if tested, can lead to knowledge.
Knowledge
However, knowledge is much more than that which is rooted in experiences. If we know that 2=2 and 2+2=4, do we not know that 2+2+2=6? Is it our opinion that 2+2+2=6, even though we have never done the math? Knowledge is much deeper than mere inferences. It encompasses that which we may not have experienced, yet know.
Perhaps you were colorblind. If you saw all the colors of the spectrum but could not perceive red, would you know it is green? You would see an absence in the spectrum. Having no knowledge of green, would you be able to infer the color? Would this be knowledge, or opinion? Your experiences have not acquainted you with the color, yet you are familiar with it because everything else suggests what it is. Before yellow, there is orange. Before blue and after yellow, there is a color that you have not perceived, but are able to infer upon. Like algebra, you are familiar with all the constants, but the variables are unknown to you. Knowing what they equate to you deduce what the variable is. This is rooted in algebraic principles and proofs. Does knowledge about our world work similarly?
This may help us understand whether meno’s paradox can be upheld. Meno asserts that one cannot inquire about the things he does not know either because he knows it and does not need to inquire, but he does not know it and cannot inquire. Perhaps, like the illustration of the missing color, we can inquire into those things we do not know. If knowledge is rooted in experience, cannot we infer about the gaps in our knowledge. Cannot we inquire about the absent color between yellow and blue. Would we not know there is a absent color? Are there additional colors that we cannot see?
Can our knowledge about non-particulars lead us to inquire about particulars? If we have a puzzle that is fully constructed, but missing some pieces here and there, we are able to infer the general nature of the missing puzzle piece. By examining the gap we can produce an accurate opinion of the missing puzzle piece But is this knowledge or opinion? We can know certainly what piece is missing, though we never saw the missing piece. Perhaps we do not know what piece fits into the gap, but can we know for sure what doesn’t? If this puzzle contained a picture, we would have even more to infer about. We could follow the contour lines and colors and shades of the image, and using our imagination, fill in the pieces characteristics. We would not know exactly what the piece would look like, but we could be very close.
In the Meno, Socrates attempts to illustrate how knowledge is recollected by giving a slave, with no formal education, a lesson in geometry. The slave, having no particular knowledge of geometry, is able to arrive at correct knowledge of a geometric proof..
William Dare 